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This paper presents a way of studying the rationality that mathematics teachers utilize in managing 
the teaching of theorems in high school geometry. More generally, the study illustrates how to elicit 
the rationality that guides teachers in handling the demands of teaching practice. In particular, it 
illustrates how problematic classroom scenarios represented through animations of cartoon 
characters can facilitate thought experiments among groups of practitioners. Relying on video 
records from four study group sessions with experienced teachers of geometry, the study shows how 
these records can be parsed and inspected to identify categories of perception and appreciation with 
which experienced practitioners relate to an instance of an instructional situation. The study 
provides initial evidence that supports a theoretically-derived hypothesis, namely that teachers of 
geometry as a group recognize as normative the expectation that a teacher will sanction or endorse 
those propositions that are to be remembered as theorems for later use. In interacting with a story in 
which students had proven a proposition that the teacher had not identified as a theorem, the study 
also shows the kind of tactical resources that teachers of geometry could use to make it feasible for 
students to reuse such a proposition.  
                                                
1 The research reported in this article is supported by NSF, grant ESI-0353285 to the first and third authors. Opinions 
expressed here are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not reflect the views of the Foundation.  
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This paper illustrates a way of eliciting what we call the practical rationality of mathematics 
teaching. Following Herbst & Chazan (2003) and building on Bourdieu’s (1990) work on the logic 
of practice we hypothesize that a teacher’s actions in an instructional situation are modulated by a 
practical rationality, a feel for the game, which an outside observer might describe as dispositions to 
act in certain ways. These dispositions, as described by an external observer, or the “categories of 
perception and appreciation” of teachers (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 11) consist of 
descriptions of perceptions of the moments, actions, people, and objects that are salient to members 
of a practice in a situation in which they practice. Practical rationality consists also of the principles 
or values that members of a practice use to justify or otherwise discard possible actions in an 
instructional situation.  
To be clear, we do not suggest that this practical rationality dictates a particular course of 
action in a particular event. Rather, this rationality describes what is perceived in instruction and 
outlines boundaries between what it is reasonable, or customary, for a teacher to do and what is 
deemed as ‘out of bounds.’ At present we are interested in characterizing the sets of dispositions 
that are available to a group of practitioners, for example those who teach a same course of studies; 
we expect that latter work may take us to inspect individual differences. The present contribution 
zooms into an instructional situation in the teaching of high school geometry and illustrates a 
technique we have designed to elicit the practical rationality that a group of teachers had available 
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to handle one of the demands of that instructional situation. This technique includes the use of 
animated scenarios that display instruction that departs, in places, from what is customary; groups 
of teachers experienced in geometry confronted one such scenario, and we analyzed their comments 
in search for elements of the practical rationality of geometry instruction.   
In this paper, we concentrate on the instructional situation of installing a new theorem in 
high school geometry. We ask, what dispositions modulate the work of a teacher “installing” an 
item of knowledge in class? In particular, what dispositions frame the work of making a geometric 
statement part of the public knowledge (Ball & Bass, 2000) that can be used later in justifying other 
claims? In institutionalized mathematics instruction, the tacit contract between a class of students 
and their teacher about a course of studies includes the expectation that students will come to know 
particular items of knowledge at some point during the time of those studies. After that point, 
students can be held accountable for having and using such item of knowledge.2 In this sense we 
say that an item of knowledge (a definition, theorem, postulate, or algorithm) has been “installed” in 
a class, when a teacher is entitled to consider that students in a class can be held accountable for 
using that knowledge. And we use the words “installing” and “installation” to refer to the work that 
a teacher and her class do to install an item of knowledge.  
An important question that instantiates the notion of practical rationality in geometry 
instruction is what dispositions undergird experienced teachers’ work of installing an item of 
knowledge. This question is important especially because recommendations for practice put a 
premium on students’ active participation in the development of mathematical knowledge that is 
new to them. Thus the question attempts to elicit what dispositions could support (or constrain) 
devolving more of the work of installing a theorem to students, while still entitling the teacher to 
                                                
2 Note that installation does not mean the same as learning since students might be held accountable for knowing 
something, while at the same time some individual students might not actually be able to use that knowledge. 
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hold students accountable for knowing and being able to use the target item of knowledge. Though 
much typical instruction is premised on the notion that teachers must take full responsibility for 
installing new knowledge, there are examples of teachers who have sought to devolve some of that 
work to students (see Fawcett, 1938; Healy, 1993).  The question of how much responsibility could 
be shared with students for the installation of new knowledge has been studied from the perspective 
of the design of learning (e.g., see Brousseau, 1997; also Balacheff, 1991). In particular the notion 
of an adidactical situation of validation where students develop and recognize new knowledge 
through adapting to the demands of their milieu has been proposed to frame that research.  
This paper complements the perspective of designers of learning by inquiring into the 
perspective of the teacher and the rationality that animates the teacher’s practice. Our question is 
what dispositions could be available for teachers to use in figuring out how to handle, in practice, 
the responsibilities that they customarily have in the installation of new knowledge. We investigate 
this question for the particular case of the installation of theorems in the high school geometry class. 
To further illustrate what we mean by installing a theorem, we invite the reader to consider the 
following story.3  
In a high school geometry class, a student (Rho) shows the answer to a homework problem 
(problem 33). The problem includes a diagram of an isosceles triangle (ABC) and the 
“Given: ” and “Prove ∠ B = ∠C.” A hint (“Draw a median to ”) is provided 
(see Figure 1a). The student provides a proof and goes back to her seat (see Figure 1b). The 
teacher notes that the class should make sure they understand what Rho has done. After 
finishing the review of the rest of the homework, the teacher assigns a new problem, “Prove 
that by connecting the midpoints of an isosceles triangle, one gets another isosceles 
triangle.” On the board the teacher draws a triangle ABC and writes: Given: , D, 
E and F are midpoints (of the sides of ABC). Prove: DEF is isosceles (see Figure 1c). 
Students work on the problem in pairs. When the teacher calls on students to show what they 
did, students Lambda and Kappa say that they have drawn a median to the base of the given 
isosceles triangle, proved that the base angles are congruent, and used that to show that 
triangles ADF and CEF are congruent. Using that idea, those students have shown that 
                                                
3 The reader may also watch an animation of this scenario in ThEMaT Online, http://grip.umich.edu/themat, selecting 
the Isosceles Triangles story. 
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DEF is isosceles. Another student complains that the problem was long. Yet another 
student notes that they had looked ahead in the book and saw the base angles theorem, 
which they thought would be useful, but they did not use it because they had not covered it 
yet. The teacher is distressed by the fact that no student has used the result they proved for 
homework. Frustrated, he says that the problem “could have been much shorter” and asks 
Rho to remind the class of the result she had proven and which the teacher seems to think 
could have been used here to justify steps in the proof. But Rho seems not to remember the 




Figure 1a: Problem 33 Figure 1b: Rho’s proof Figure 1c. The second problem. 
 
In this scenario, the teacher expects that his students use, as a theorem, the result that if a 
triangle is isosceles, the angles opposite the congruent sides are congruent. That expectation is not 
met. The story helps ask: Is this teacher’s expectation reasonable? If not, what would teachers 
consider this teacher had to do in order to deem it reasonable for him to expect students recognized 
the result proved and use it as a theorem? Evidently, one possible answer is that the teacher could 
spell out a theorem X and then say to students “use the theorem X in problem Y.” But considering 
that it is desirable for students to be agents in the construction of knowledge, what do teachers 
consider a teacher needs to do to be able to fairly expect that students identify the proven result as a 
theorem and know that they can use it as such? If the rationality of the practice sets as the default 
expectation for teachers to sanction memorable statements as “theorems,” how could a teacher 
handle departures from such a default setting and still avail him or herself of the right to consider a 
proposition to have been installed as theorem, and thus usable by students in the ways that theorems 
are used?  The question is particularly pressing when reformers expect teachers to share 
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responsibility with students for the development of new knowledge—when it is important to enable 
students to be autonomous with regard to knowledge. It is known that students have the capacity to 
make discoveries and that learning environments can be created for them to do that (e.g., Schwartz, 
Yerushalmy, & Wilson, 1993). But a teacher’s responsibility goes beyond supporting the emergence 
of ideas; it includes ensuring that students consider those ideas knowledge, using them as 
instruments in further intellectual pursuits. To support the work of a teacher installing a theorem, a 
teacher needs more than exhortations “not to tell” (Chazan & Ball, 1999). And yet, from a 
disciplinary perspective on mathematics one could think,4 as one might imagine the teacher in the 
story did, that if a result has been proven it could be used to prove new results. Particularly in the 
American high school geometry class, where students are explicitly inducted into an organization of 
knowledge that puts a premium on establishing true propositions by proving them, one might think 
that students should have no doubt of the truth of the result the student has proved (unlike students 
in Williams, 1979).  
In showing animated versions of that story to teachers, as researchers, we are interested in 
understanding how teachers of geometry talk about why students in the story failed to use the 
proved result and what the teacher might have done to prevent such failure. We use their responses 
to that story (1) to confirm that, as a group, teachers of geometry perceive there is an expectation for 
them to sanction a statement as theorem in order to consider it installed as knowledge and (2) to 
elicit the possible moves that a teacher could make to depart from such a default expectation and 
allocate greater agency to students. From the latter moves, we distill some of the dispositions of 
practical rationality--what teachers perceive as alternative actions in that story and how those 
possible actions could be justified. 
                                                
4 This thought overlooks what Davis & Hersh (1981) argue—that the social shapes what is installed as a theorem in the 
discipline. 
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Theoretical Framework: Practical Rationality and Instructional Situations 
Practical Rationality’s Relation within the Research on Teaching Literature  
The literature on teaching abounds in words and approaches that have been used to (1) 
describe the actions that teachers take and (2) identify the set of resources with which teachers 
warrant their action. Observers of classroom interaction have described teacher’s actions using 
constructs such as the notion of a cultural teaching “script” (Stigler and Hiebert, 1999; Santagata 
and Barbieri, 2005), patterns and routines of classroom interaction (Bauersfeld, 1988; Mehan, 1979; 
Voigt, 1985), activity types or activity structures (Leinhardt & Greeno, 1985; Lemke, 1990), 
problems of teaching (Lampert, 2001), and ventures, moves, and strategies (Cooney, Davis, and 
Henderson, 1975; Smith, Meux, et al. 1962).  
The resources with which teachers warrant what to do have been identified with the 
assistance of a number of germane notions including Schoen’s (1983) knowledge-in-action and 
reflection-in-action, Leinhardt’s (1990) craft knowledge, Shulman’s (2000) wisdom of practice, 
Fenstermacher’s and Richardson’s (1993) practical argument, Doyle & Ponder’s (1977/1978) 
practicality ethic, and various approaches to teacher beliefs (in mathematics and its teaching; e.g., 
Ernest, 1991; Leder, Pehknonen, and Törner, 2002; Philipp, 2007; Speer, 2005). Also several 
notions of teacher knowledge have been proposed including Shulman’s (1986) pedagogical content 
knowledge, and various conceptualizations of mathematical knowledge for teaching (Ball, 
Lubienski, and Mewborn, 2001; Ball, Thames, and Phelps, 2008; Even, 1990; Silverman & 
Thompson, 2008; Thompson & Thompson, 1996). The distinction between professed beliefs and 
attributed beliefs has been used to account for the relationship between those resources and 
pedagogical action (Törner, 2002) and researchers have found consistencies as well as 
inconsistencies between what teachers profess and what they do (see Cohen, 1990; Raymond, 1997; 
Thompson, 1984, 1992).  
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In an attempt to pull together the literature on the resources with which teachers warrant 
their actions, Schoenfeld (1999, 2006) has proposed a way of modeling individual teachers’ actions, 
described at different levels of granularity, as responding to their beliefs, goals, and knowledge; this 
has added to earlier literature on teacher decision-making (e.g., Shavelson and Stern, 1981; Borko 
and Shavelson, 1990). As can be noted, the literature that explores the connections between teacher 
thinking and action in the last four decades is vast. It is also a diverse literature not only in the 
constructs and underlying theoretical commitments but also in the methods and techniques that it 
uses.  
While an organized review of that large body of literature is beyond the scope of this paper, 
we make three synthetic observations about that literature that help us identify the nature of our 
contribution to existing theory and research. A first observation is that most accounts of the 
relationship between teacher thinking and action (e.g., Schoenfeld, 1999) have focused on teachers 
as individuals who enact their personal goals, knowledge, or beliefs in actions in which they are 
relatively autonomous. A second observation is that a large part of that literature that links teacher 
thinking with action has relied on techniques (such as the interview, the questionnaire, or the 
stimulated recall) that presume the explicitness of that thinking for the practitioner. Exceptions to 
this observation include the investigations of teaching that examined teacher narratives (e.g., 
Clandinin and Connelly, 1996) and the use of individual teachers’ responses to similes and 
metaphors of teaching (e.g., Cooney, Shealy, and Arvold, 1998). A third synthetic observation is 
that by and large the literature has not systematically examined the rationality of mathematics 
teaching in specific situations but has rather taken the teaching of a lesson or of an individual 
teacher as a relatively homogeneous locus where a general rationality applies. We see this present in 
the attempts to describe actions as expression of different kinds of teaching (traditional, reform; 
Boaler, 2002; Cobb, Wood, Yackel, and McNeal, 1992) or expression of different cultures of 
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teaching (Stigler & Hiebert, 1999). A notable exception of this is the cognitive modeling of teaching 
approach of Leinhardt & Greeno (1985) focused on activity structures. 
In our research program on the practical rationality of mathematics teaching, we start from a 
set of assumptions that is more in line with the descriptive literature on teacher practice. We view 
mathematics instruction as a practice, done recurrently by people playing specific roles (Buchmann, 
1986). The conditions in which this practice is enacted issue specific obligations to those in the role 
of teacher—in particular, obligations to the discipline whose knowledge is the subject of instruction, 
to the individual students who are there to learn, to the classroom space and community as a public 
channel of interaction, and to the instructional setting and processes of schooling (schedules, 
assessments, curricula, etc.). We hypothesize that those obligations have an influence on what 
practitioners do, even if practitioners are not able to articulate consciously the effects of these 
obligations. For example, in our view, as in other practices, experienced geometry teachers figure 
out what to do by a combination of goal-oriented strategies and tactical responses to events in 
context.  
Our approach contributes to the extant mathematics education literature on the relationship 
between teacher thinking and their action by highlighting normative elements with which a 
professional collective (such as the teachers of a particular course of studies, taken as a group) could 
endorse, accept, or disown, actions by a purported member of such collective.  This collective 
perspective complements the literature’s focus on individual teachers by exploring the customary 
practices of teaching into which individuals are socialized and the rationality behind them. We are 
interested in understanding what principles could possibly justify or indict actions that deviate from 
what is expected within the discourse of a collective, rather than the personal motives or reasons for 
individual teachers to choose some actions over others (see Buchmann, 1986).  
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Second, our data collection technique—the triggering of practitioners’ reactions to narratives 
of practice represented through animations of cartoon characters—builds on the narrative inquiry 
paradigm as well as on the ethnomethodological notion of breaching experiment and enable us to 
unearth usually tacit elements of rationality. In that sense we contribute to the arsenal of methods 
that could be available for the study of teachers (see also Jacobs and Morita, 2002). Inasmuch as 
some of the elements that help explain teaching action are tacit, it is important for the field to have 
techniques that elicit them without a mediating process in which they become explicit (which would 
be the case using survey instruments). Third, while we are not necessarily intent in deconstructing 
the notion that the rationality of teaching has components that operate on teaching mathematics in 
general, we provide a way of examining how the rationality of teaching operates in instructional 
situations within specific courses of study. Along these lines, our technique of eliciting teachers’ 
reactions to animated or cartoon-based stories that prototype instructional situations helps unearth 
situated elements of this rationality in ways that improve upon other possible tools such as the 
written vignette. To the extent that the cartoon-representation of people and settings can be 
controlled to abstract some elements of context and focus on chosen elements of practice, our 
technique appears to be more malleable than video for the development of research instruments. 
Furthermore, the facility with which many developments of a classroom episode can be represented 
in the same graphic language presents an advantage over other means of representing alternatives in 
teaching (such as offering a video record and a written description of an alternative) in the sense 
that all possible developments of an episode can be presented on comparable terms (see also Herbst, 
Chazan, Chen, Chieu, and Weiss, in press). Our bet is that a combination of situation-specific and 
profession-general regulations would eventually help account for action in mathematics teaching; 
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this paper however presents a first approximation focused on the situation of installing a theorem in 
high school geometry.  
Building on Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of habitus (or practical reason; see 1998) we use the 
expression practical rationality to refer to the categories of perception and appreciation with which 
teachers talk about how they handle the demands of their work, and the dispositions that, as a result, 
observers ascribe to teachers’ actions.5 By proposing that term, practical rationality, we postulate 
that the practice of teaching mathematics is regulated by knowledge and principles that derive from 
professional obligations on the position of the teacher and the demands on the role the teacher needs 
to play in specific contracts and instructional situations. Further, we hypothesize that while some of 
those regulatory elements are explicit, many others are tacit (Cook & Brown, 1999; Linde, 2001); 
while some elements are strategic (goal-oriented), others are tactical, adaptable to respond to 
immediate context. We are presently concerned with the content of practical rationality rather than 
its locus of control and change (the individual agent, the professional collective, the policy makers) 
or its ontogenesis. We speculate that practical rationality may exist as a result of development by 
adaptation to the demands and affordances of a specific kind of work and used to handle those 
demands. And, for that reason, we hypothesize that practical rationality is first and foremost a 
characteristic of a practice, not reducible to individual differences. This hypothesis helps us 
understand how the actions of teachers, diverse as they may be from some points of view, all bear 
the imprints of schooling in order to be viable actions on the part of a teacher in the social setting 
we call school. In what follows we develop a theoretical perspective to conceptualize what we mean 
                                                
5 Philosopher of education Thomas Green (1976) also alluded to “practical rationality” but without a definition. And 
Immanuel Kant (see Reath, 2006) used “practical rationality” also but while his interest seems to have been on the 
structure and logic of practical reason, our interest is in its content.   
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above by the demands of the role the teacher needs to play in specific contracts and instructional 
situations. 
A Theory of Instructional Exchanges 
The responsibility to teach a particular mathematical domain (such as algebra or geometry) 
to high school students in school classrooms places the teacher in a set of global relationships with 
the subject matter and the students (Cohen, Raudenbush, and Ball, 2003). Those relationships 
operate like a contract particularly defining role relationships between teacher and students vis-à-vis 
the subject of studies (Brousseau, 1997; Herbst, 2002, 2003): In general, for high school geometry, 
the contract says that the geometry teacher must teach geometry to his or her students and shares 
responsibility with them for their learning of geometry. The contract embodies obligations to the 
discipline of mathematics, to students as individuals, to the general processes of school instruction 
(its schedules and assessments), and to social interaction (that of the class as a group)—see Herbst 
& Balacheff (2009). Any institutionalized instruction has a contract that ties teacher, student, and 
subject matter by providing a general interpretation of those obligations, enforced through the 
particular custom of a class (Balacheff, 1999). In particular any contract is a contract for 
transactions about a more or less well defined body of knowledge. For example, the mainstream 
contract for the US high school geometry course6 includes, in particular, the customary obligation to 
represent geometry as a system of theorems and definitions derived deductively from postulates and 
basic terms and the customary obligation to develop in students knowledge of those definitions and 
theorems and their connections, and the more general capacity to reason deductively. More 
generally (shared with other school courses) contractual norms are likely to exist to regulate 
                                                
6 At various points in time there have been calls for laboratory geometry courses that follow inductive or informal 
approaches to the subject, We consider those as different contracts which are not addressed in this study.  
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interaction about knowledge—for example the notion that the teacher has the right to ask 
knowledge questions to students and expect an answer in return.  
Against the background of that general contract, concrete instances of mathematical work, 
including mathematical tasks, happen day-to-day and moment-by-moment. Novel tasks might 
require the teacher and students to negotiate explicitly how their class contract applies to those tasks 
(that is, what it is that people need to do to teach and learn the knowledge at stake in that particular 
task; see Herbst, 2003). Yet quite often, classroom activity goes forward smoothly—without 
explicit discussion, people act as if they knew what they are supposed to do in order to play their 
role in the contract.  
One specific class of items of the high school geometry contract are geometric theorems 
(true and important statements that articulate geometric theory): Theorems need to be represented 
faithfully and they need to be learned and used by students as reasons in justifying new claims 
(Senk, 1989). We are interested in what it is that teachers tacitly accept responsibility for doing, 
what they expect they have to do when the representation and the learning of a theorem are at stake.      
Herbst (2006) has proposed that the didactical contract is elaborated and enforced in the 
context of instructional situations--particular frames  (Goffman, 1974) of activity where students 
and teacher can trade some of the work they do together (e.g., in the context of a specific kind of 
mathematical task) for claims that students have had opportunities to learn about a specific (kind of) 
object of study prescribed in the contract (say through the syllabus). The notion of an instructional 
situation is useful to understand the particular position of the teacher who often has to manage 
interactions with students not only strategically (i.e., oriented to the procurement of contractual 
goals) but also tactically (i.e., adapting to the give and take of human interaction).  An instructional 
situation can be understood as a system of norms (or tacit requirements) that regulate a particular 
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kind of exchange or trade between two kinds of goods. One kind of goods is the actual work that 
teacher and students do together to sustain their mutual relationship with content—materialized in 
the form of talk and action, moment-by-moment. The other kind of goods are the mathematical 
knowledge and the students’ learning of them that a teacher needs to lay claim on—a teacher needs 
to be able to say that such-and-such idea has been taught or that students have had the opportunity 
to learn that idea.  
Instructional situations facilitate the management of that exchange by framing chunks of 
interaction. Specifically, we hypothesize that classroom life is organized in segments of interaction 
whose goal is to produce mathematical work and exchange it for claims on the knowledge at stake. 
Examples of instructional situations include “doing proofs” (Herbst et al., 2009) in high school 
geometry and “solving equations (in one variable)” in algebra I (Chazan & Lueke, 2009). In this 
paper we use the situation that we call “installing a theorem” in high school geometry (see Herbst & 
Miyakawa, 2008) as a context to study the practical rationality that assists teachers in handling the 
demands of that situation. As noted in Herbst et al. (2009; see also Nachlieli and Herbst, 2009) part 
of our work includes modeling instructional situations by making hypotheses about what those 
situations customarily require. We call those requirements norms to underscore that they are 
requirements the situation makes of participants. Everything happens as if participants held 
themselves accountable to fulfill them even though such accountability is tacit and their actions may 
somehow deviate from the norm. Norms are thus neither ineluctable like physical laws nor 
compulsory like the rules of a game. They rather are defaults, or tacit expectations about behavior 
that if done, would go without saying (see Bourdieu, 1990).  
In this article we examine the situation of “installing a theorem” in the mainstream, US high 
school geometry course. We make the hypothesis, grounded in observations of a large corpus of 
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high school geometry lessons, that to install a statement as usable knowledge, teachers recognize as 
a default their responsibility to sanction a statement as theorem—that is teachers expect that they 
will have to attribute a status, such as theorem (or property), to the target statement that students are 
to learn (and use). The main contribution of this article is to show a technique that can elicit from 
teachers the elements of practical rationality that they have available, as a collective, to handle 
(comply with, depart from) that norm. This technique, which we describe below, builds on ideas 
from the ethnomethodological tradition (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970).  
We contend that in order to know whether and how instructional practices can be changed 
(e.g., whether new theorems can come from students’ work on problems; see Lampert, 2001), we 
need to better understand how practical rationality works to sustain and organize customary 
instructional practices. The notions of situation and of norm of a situation are valuable insofar as 
they help design ways of uncovering that rationality and explaining how that rationality works. If 
we compare teaching with dance, situations and norms are comparable to the possibilities and 
limitations of human body posture and movement, but knowledge of those is only background for 
the choreographer to compose a ballet or for the critic to assess a performance. Thus, when we are 
concerned with improving or assessing teaching, the focus is on assessing or improving the 
resources for action; norms and situations are instruments to understand and shape those. 
Method 
Hypothetical Norms and Breached Representations 
To understand the rationality that undergirds the work of a teacher of geometry installing a 
theorem we start from hypothesizing norms that describe the instructional situation of interest. We 
reiterate that what we mean by a norm is a statement of one of the demands or controls that affects 
the way a role (the teacher, in this case) is played in an instructional situation. The norm might be 
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attributed if classroom participants (teachers, in this case) acted as if they held themselves 
accountable to do what the norm says whenever they acknowledge being in a given instructional 
situation. Such approach could document the frequency of behaviors consistent with a norm and 
thus provide evidence that, at best, would give no grounds to reject the existence of a norm yet not 
necessarily capture the extent to which a norm exists that compels participants to act in such ways. 
We propose an alternative technique of eliciting norms that helps document that compulsion. Our 
technique relies on conceptualizing norms as expectations of default behavior that, were they to take 
place in an instance of an instructional situation, they would go without saying but were they to be 
breached, they would elicit ad hoc “repairs” (which we elaborate on below). For this investigation 
we hypothesized as a norm that if a teacher will be able to hold students accountable for using a 
theorem (i.e., for teachers to be able to assume that a statement has been installed as theorem), the 
teacher will have to sanction (or endorse) the statement of interest by investing it with the special 
status of theorem (also property or lemma).7 The method we introduce is not only suited to confirm 
that such norm exists, but also, and more importantly, to elicit from teachers the categories of 
perception and appreciation available for them to construct possible alterations to the default actions 
stipulated by the norm.8   
We use that hypothesized norm of the instructional situation of installing a theorem to create 
an experimental probe with which to study the practical rationality behind teachers’ management of 
the situation. To do this we build on the ethnomethodological tradition of “breaching experiments” 
(Mehan & Wood, 1975) in which models of practical actions are put to empirical test by creating 
practical circumstances (experiences) that instantiate the situation under study but where a norm has 
                                                
7 The making of such hypothesis is grounded in a corpus of geometry lessons in four intact classrooms where most 
times that a theorem is installed the teachers sanction it as such. 
8 We note also that in making this hypothesis we mean neither to subscribe nor to object to the norm. This is a norm 
that (we hypothesize) underlies practice as it exists regardless of our opinion of it. 
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been purposely breached. The experiment consists of engaging individuals who are experienced 
participants of the situation being modeled and observing whether and how they react to the 
breaches of the norm included in the experience. The purpose of studying those reactions is twofold. 
First, the hypothesized norm can be confirmed by observing whether participants respond to their 
breach. Second, by examining what participants say in response to such breaches, the role of the 
norms can be explored so as to better understand, from the practitioners’ perspective, what keeps 
those norms in place and what resources practitioners have to handle them (and perhaps depart from 
them). While the breaching experiments of ethnomethodologists originally immersed participants in 
real, but breached, social situations, our approach consists of confronting practitioners with 
representations of classroom events realized with animations of cartoon characters. 
Thought Experiments with Groups of Practitioners 
To explore teachers’ practical rationality apropos of the situation of installing a theorem, we 
created experiences in which practitioners confronted the classroom story narrated above, which 
had been represented through an animation of cartoon characters. The story can be seen as an 
(unsuccessful) attempt at the “installation” of a theorem: The teacher in the story acts as if the 
students should be able to use the result proved in the homework to solve the problem of the day, 
but the students act as if what they proved before is not a result that they could use.  
The story also helps illustrate the technique we use to elicit teachers’ views about what is 
involved in the work of managing the installation of a theorem: The story has many features that 
make it a conceivable story from a US geometry classroom, but in particular it probes the 
hypothesized norm by showing actions that depart from what the norm stipulates the teacher to be 
expected to do. In particular, while in the story the students prove a useful result, the teacher does 
not sanction it as a theorem, and yet he expects them to use it in the following problem. Based on 
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our hypothesis, for the teacher to be entitled to expect his students to use the prior result in the 
following problem, he would have had to do more than overseeing the proof of the result. In 
particular, he would have needed to sanction the statement as theorem.  
 Thus the story illustrates our technique in the following way: The story embodies a 
piecemeal alteration of what, we hypothesize, is normative in “installing a theorem.” We contend 
that the story can be used as a probe to study specifically whether such hypothesis describes an 
aspect of the role teachers are expected to play in installing a theorem and what elements of 
practical rationality sustain that demand. Specifically, we contend that by immersing practitioners in 
the story we can observe how they relate to events in this story and thus add credence to, or refute, 
the hypothesized norm. More importantly, the discourse that practitioners engage in when they 
address those problematic events may help us understand their perspective on what role the norm 
plays in the instructional situation and what resources practitioners have available, as a collective, to 
warrant acting in consonance with the norm or otherwise departing from it.  
 To be able to immerse practitioners in stories like the one narrated at the beginning, we have 
produced stories as animated movies of cartoon characters. We have used them to prompt groups of 
practitioners to talk about how they manage instructional situations in the geometry class. Central to 
this technique is that these practitioners recognize themselves as being subject to the same demands 
as the teacher whose records they confront (e.g., they also have to teach the base angles theorem in 
a high school geometry course) and can hold each other accountable to responding to the demands 
of their professional position. In this sense, the use of these materials with groups of teachers 
affords something that we believe would not be afforded by having individual participants respond 
to the same materials: It affords conditions that can precipitate and enforce a professional discussion 
of what practitioners perceive they are expected to do by the demands of their role (rather than what 
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they personally would like to do; see Buchmann, 1986). A thought experiment in mathematics 
teaching by a group of participants provides less of a view on what each individual believes (which 
we are not focusing on at present) and more of what the practice (as approximated by a group of 
experienced practitioners) requires or allows them to do.  
Central to our methodology is a stance on this group discourse as an emergent debate about 
the practice that the participants share. We expect that the homogeneity of the group shape what can 
be said in the group (e.g., there are some things they take for granted by virtue of their assumed 
common experiences, non-standard views must be marked as such). We conceptualize the discourse 
in a study group as the product of the group, where participants adapt what they say to the particular 
conversation they are having; the discourse is not conceptualized as produced by a juxtaposition of 
individuals each of which makes independent, individual comments. More importantly, we are 
interested in what gets said, rather than in who says it. Thus, we do not seek to establish the strength 
of a norm by the number of people whose utterances seem to support the norm, but instead by 
examining what is said and how often, as well as what is not said.  
While the present study’s focus on groups of practitioners shares that feature with earlier 
papers (Herbst & Chazan, 2003; Nachlieli & Herbst, 2009; Weiss, Herbst, & Chen, 2008), this one 
offers an application of the same technique for the study of a different instructional situation, 
installing a theorem. The present study adds to that focus the use of video prompts generated with 
animated cartoon characters. The details of how those cartoon characters have been designed and 
the argument for their use instead of video is a matter is beyond the scope of this paper (but see 
Chazan & Herbst, in review; Herbst & Chazan, 2006; Herbst & Miyakawa, 2008). 
Our method is thus based on the assumption that the confrontation of a relatively 
homogeneous group (experienced high school geometry teachers) against an atypical, but 
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conceivable, way of meeting an obligation specific to their job can be used to elicit data that helps 
study the practical rationality related to the sanctioning-of-a-theorem norm hypothesized above. 
Conversations in which teachers offer and consider alternative courses of action that might fulfill 
the same obligation, but prevent the problems they perceive being raised in the story under 
consideration, conversations in which they discuss whether and why one alternative might be better 
than another are what we call “thought experiments in mathematics teaching.”  
We contend that such thought experiments—encounters of a group of practitioners who are 
all responsible for similar curricular obligations with an atypical instance of a way to meet such 
obligation—are the kind of experiments in teaching that can lead us to understand what kind of 
practice teaching is (Cohen, 2005). Specifically, the discourse produced by teachers in response to 
an atypical story of their practice, the discourse where they remark upon the events of a story to 
negotiate the conditions in which the story could be a representation of their practice, can contain 
the categories of perception and appreciation that span the practical rationality on which actual 
performances of their teaching are grounded.  
The Data that Can be Generated with this Technique 
Our theory enables us to predict that a classroom story where a teacher laid claim on the 
installation of a theorem without having complied with the sanctioning norm would elicit repairs 
(ad hoc commentaries denouncing the scenario) on the part of those teachers of geometry who 
viewed their “colleague” frustrated by his students’ actions.  
We predicted that participants who were experienced in installing theorems would produce 
ad hoc remarks that would either repair the situation (i.e., explain that what had been done could 
not have been a case of installing a theorem or cast the episode as an instance of a different 
situation), or repair some of the tasks of the teacher or the student enacting the situation (i.e., 
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explain how some of the things done would have needed to be done differently for the episode to 
represent the installation of a theorem). In general, we expected teachers would act as if the 
animation said something to the effect of “this teacher thinks he has taught the theorem, but he has 
not.” Specifically, we expected that participants would do such repairs by identifying moments in 
the story when something out of the ordinary had happened (or something ordinarily needed had not 
happened). We expected that, in confirming our hypotheses by way of those repairs, participants 
would disclose elements of their practical rationality. Specifically, we expected that in describing 
and allocating value to the events in the story, participants would make use of categories of 
perception and appreciation that are part of the practical rationality they use to organize viable 
action in installing a theorem, in particular outlining alternative courses of action that could have 
been followed. By categories of perception we mean the categories used by participants to describe 
objects, people, and actions involved in the story or in alternatives to the story. By categories of 
appreciation we mean principles and values used to argue for or warrant actions in the story.  
Data Collection 
Geometry Study Groups as Sites for Data Collection 
We recruited high school teachers with 3 or more years of experience teaching the geometry 
course and organized them into two parallel study groups that met monthly to discuss issues related 
to geometry instruction.9 The story “Isosceles triangles: A homework problem” was considered in 
parts of four sessions, two for each of the two different groups of participants. We refer to those 
sessions as ITH-111605, ITH-121505, ESP-011006 and ESP-020706; these names identify each of 
the groups and preserve the dates when the sessions were held. By the time these sessions were 
                                                
9 Study groups eventually met for two years and generated a large data corpus of over 120 hours of group discussion.  
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held, participants had already been having conversations about teaching stimulated by animated 
cartoon characters for at least two months and were thus used to each other and to the media. 
We use records of four of those sessions to show how the technique described in this article 
helps elicit empirical data. All of those meetings were video-recorded by two cameras that, 
combined, kept track of the facial expressions and movements of all members of the group in 
addition to recording the spoken words of everybody at the table. In each of the sessions, a staff 
member acted as moderator while one or two other staff members sat at the table with a group of 
teachers playing the role of provocateurs. These staff members were asked to play complementary 
roles: While the moderator had the role of making participants feel comfortable sharing their 
opinions and maintaining the continuity of the conversation, the provocateur or researcher was 
expected to probe comments that might inform the research questions of the study (see Nachlieli & 
Herbst, 2010; Nachlieli, in review). The teacher participants in sessions ITH-111605 and ITH-
121405 included Cynthia, Denise, Edwin, Glen (absent for ITH-111605), Megan, Penelope, and 
Tina (all pseudonyms). They came from a diverse set of school districts—Penelope, Tina, and 
Megan came from three different urban districts; Denise came from a blue-collar suburb and Edwin 
from an affluent suburb; Cynthia and Glen came from small towns. The participants in sessions 
ESP-011006 and ESP-020706 included Carl, Esther, James, Karen, Megan10, and Mitch (though 
Mitch was absent in the first one, and Carl and Karen were absent in the second one). Carl and 
Karen taught in the same urban district as Megan. James and Esther taught in two different small 
towns, and Mitch taught in a large urban district. They had been recruited under the premise that 
their participation in conversations about teaching would help collect the wisdom of practice. 
                                                
10 Megan had moved from the “Wednesday” to the “Tuesday” group after Christmas, so she participated of all four 
sessions. Some references were carried over from one set of discussions to the other because of this.  
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Parsing and Transcription of Records  
 Video records from these study group sessions were synchronized and stitched together into 
a double-wide video screen that covered all the participants at all times. To preface the way we 
parsed or unitized the data it bears restating that we are not here interested in examining individual 
stances toward the scenarios shown in the animation, but rather in what are all the different things 
that the group had to say in response to it. Hence, rather than tracing what an individual contributed 
to a long series of short conversations, we were interested in mapping the content of this series of 
short conversations. The following articulates how we went about developing a unit of analysis that 
then would help us map the many conversations among these groups of teachers.  
The video records were examined first by way of an analysis of interaction in which we 
parsed each three-hour record into units of analysis that we call intervals and that operationalize the 
notion that within a long meeting there are many smaller conversations. As a unit of analysis, 
intervals are, fundamentally, emic—that is intervals are constructed by the participants (through 
their actions) rather than specified by the observer. An interval consists of segments of group 
interaction that participants construct as units of conversation by way of employing a combination 
of the organizational features (inspired by what Hymes, 1977, suggests as defining characteristics of 
a communicational event in ethnography of communication) such as: 
• Active Participants: An interval involves a subset of participants of the study group as active 
participants, whereas others are passive. 
• Specialized division of labor in the conversation: The active participants stage a 
conversation that could be described as a conversational pattern, (e.g., storytelling, chit-chat; 
see Eggins and Slade, 2005) where they assume specialized roles (e.g., one is narrator, the 
others provide cues). The pattern might be described using body orientation (especially of 
peripheral members who give clues as to who they are attending to), time per turn per 
participant, etc. 
• Participants may explicitly label the theme they are discussing (e.g., “I’d like to come back 
to Lynn’s earlier comment”) and moves of this sort can be useful to parse intervals.  
• Special artifacts are used (e.g., an easel pad or a piece of paper) 
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• Intervals are of the order of 2 to 8 minutes, though these are occasionally very short (a 
minute or so), or very long (more than ten minutes).  
• Once we identify emic boundaries of intervals using the features noted above, and 
considering that those changes also take place over time rather than at a particular moment, 
we round the beginning and end points of intervals to include boundaries and round 
timecodes to the 5th second below (viz. above).  
• With these rules, intervals end up being not disjoint; rather, contiguous intervals share 
boundary periods. 
• Changes in thematic content do not necessarily trigger a change of interval unless they are 
explicitly signaled as changes. Rather, interval parsing helps us size the posterior task of 
thematic content analysis.  
 
Operationally, we identified intervals through looking for emic boundaries, that is those liminar 
moments when changes were made to one or more of the elements listed above. Intervals are 
multimodal units; whereas speech is the dominant mode of interaction, interaction is also done 
through facial expression, gesture, written text, drawing, and silence. We therefore relied on a 
transcript of verbal acts with the understanding that the analysis of the conversation based on 
interaction between a transcript and its accompanying video might generate improvements in the 
transcript. Within each interval we identified turns as the subunit of analysis and defined turn as the 
communications exchange while one individual holds the floor.  
For the purposes of this paper, we have taken intervals as units of analysis and we have 
looked in intervals for evidence in support of our hypothesis that sanctioning a theorem is normative 
as well as evidence of the categories of perception with which participants relate to this norm. There 
were 147 intervals of the four recorded sessions in which the story “Isosceles triangles: A 
homework problem” was the intended focus of conversation. This includes intervals when 
participants watched the movie, discussed the story, considered or proposed alternatives to the 
story, narrated anecdotes of concurrent thematic content, or deviated momentarily but came back to 
the task. Of those 147 intervals, 125 contained participants’ conversations while the remaining 22 
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were ones in which participants were watching the animation. This corpus of 125 intervals is 
described in Table 1 where information is broken down by individual session. 
 











Number of Intervals 47 19 52 7 125 
Total Duration  
1h 39 m 
18 s 
1h 3 m 
36 s 
2h 34 m  
54 s 20 m 48 s 5 h 38 m 30 s 
Average duration per 
interval (in sec) 126.7 200.8 178.8 177.9 162.5 
Median Duration per 
interval (in sec) 110 180 160 140 140 
Average number of 
turns per interval 18.7 21.9 28.5 29.6 23.9 
Median number of 
turns per interval 13 24 24 28 21 
Average number of 
speakers per interval 5.4 5.2 5.8 4.4 5.5 
Median number of 
speakers per interval 5 6 6 4 5 
(*) Excludes the intervals spent watching the movie  
 
 
   
Analysis 
To examine the rationality with which participants relate to the (hypothesized) norm that the 
teacher is responsible to sanction a statement as theorem in order to consider it installed, we 
inspected the corpus described above using a layered approach. A first inspection consisted of 
looking through the 125 intervals for intervals that contained discussions of the potential connection 
of the first problem (or its result) in the doing of the second problem. In a second inspection we 
looked into the intervals produced by the first inspection and determined the extent to which those 
conversations had considered the hypothesis or its negation. Finally, in a third inspection we looked 
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into intervals where the hypothesis or its negation had been considered and extracted the ways in 
which participants perceived what had been done and what was missing in what the teacher did in 
the story, and how they appraised those actions.  
Identifying a Subcorpus of Intervals for the Hypothesized Norm 
To study the hypothesis that teachers are expected to sanction a proposition as theorem 
before holding students accountable to use the proposition as known in new problems, we restricted 
the corpus to those intervals that featured discussion about the connection between the first and 
second problems attempted by the geometry class shown in the animation. Of those 125 intervals 
potentially dedicated to discussing the story, 63 were identified as part of the sanctioning subcorpus 
in that they contained participants’ discussion of the connection between the first problem and the 
second problem. This identification had a rater reliability of 100% over 15 intervals (Cohen’s kappa 
= 1). An example of a turn in an interval that contained that kind of discussion about the connection 
are: 
Megan: Or even just add, what does this tell you about this triangle?  What's a bonus thing 
that you get [Denise: Right.] from this proof?  Or something like that.  You need some kind 
of follow-up.  Especially if you want to do that other problem.  Cause that was sort of your 
whole point of having this in the homework is so that they'd get that theorem. (ITH-121505-
17-694)11 
 
Within these 63 intervals we found how many intervals contained evidence for the sanctioning 
hypothesis. The coding relies on noting the presence or absence of features in a complete interval.  
We say that an interval contains evidence that the teacher is responsible to sanction a 
statement as theorem if the interval includes one or more participants’ expectations that the 
teacher would directly sanction it (e.g., ‘this is a theorem, use it’) or indirect ones, such as those in 
which participants expected the teacher to initiate a sanctioning process (e.g., by asking ‘what do 
                                                
11 The acronym and numbers refer to group (ITH or ESP) and session date, interval number, and turn.  
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you think we have proved here that we could use later?’). We also included as evidence 
participants’ expectations that the teacher would engage in such sanctioning immediately after 
Rho’s proof of problem 33 as well as later, such as when discussing the solution to the problem of 
the day. The evidence in favor of the hypothesis can be found in repairs of the situation of installing 
the theorem, for example if someone denied that the base angles theorems had been installed 
because the teacher had not said that Rho had proved a theorem. Evidence could also be found in 
repairs of the tasks done within the situation (or how the situation had been carried out), for 
example by the participants indicating that the teacher had missed doing something or suggesting 
that something should have been done instead.  
The key element of the hypothesis is the teacher’s responsibility to sanction (or endorse; 
Sfard, 2007) the proposition as theorem, not the manner or the moment in which she should have 
done it. The negation of the hypothesis thus says that the teacher did not need to do anything extra, 
beyond having students realize that the statement is true, to be able to consider a statement as 
usable. In other words, if the hypothesis was not tenable, teachers would consider that the mere fact 
that the statement had been proved true was enough for students to know that they can use it in 
proving new propositions. 
 To formalize these coding operations, each interval was assigned a vector (a, b) where a and 
b can be 0 or 1. For an interval to have a = 1 it meant that the interval contained evidence in support 
of the sanction hypothesis. For an interval to have b = 1 it meant that the interval contained 
evidence that supported the negation of the sanction hypothesis. Clearly, considering that intervals 
are conversations among many individuals over possibly several minutes, both kinds of evidence 
could happen in an interval; that is, an interval could contain evidence for and against a hypothesis 
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and thus be coded with the vector (1,1). An example of this is interval ESP-011006-22, which 
contains the following two turns separated by a few minutes: 
Megan: To me, until the teacher legitimizes that what that homework problem was… was a 
theorem, that's just a homework problem to them.  (ESP-011006-22-400)  
Esther: My kids … would have said, "Well now we know that," they were, they would be 
much more likely to start using it right away.  But you know, they're s-- some better students 
so… (ESP-011006-22-423) 
 
It was also possible that an interval would feature a discussion of the connection between the first 
and second problem in the movie, making reference neither to the fact that the first problem was a 
theorem since it had been proven nor to the absence of sanction. The 63 intervals that did contain 
discussions of the connection between the first and second problem were coded according to the 
rules described above. These operations had a rater reliability of 90% each; Cohen’s kappa were 
0.62 for a and 0.74 for b. Table 2 shows the results of such coding. 
 The table shows that in 51 out of 63 intervals, that is, in 81% of the intervals of this 
subcorpus, the conversation among participants remarked on the absence of the teacher’s sanction 
of the proposition proved by Rho. In contrast only 19 out of the same 63 intervals, that is in 30% of 
the intervals of this corpus, participants spoke of the proposition taking for granted that it was a 
theorem that could be used without further ado. This descriptive data adds credence to our 
hypothesis—the installation of a theorem seems to normatively require the teacher to mark a 
proposition as usable. Table 2 also shows how the numbers break down by group of practitioners—
there were more intervals in the ITH group sessions discussing the connection between the two 
problems than in the ESP sessions. Yet the extent to which both groups dwelled more on the lack of 
sanctioning than on the lack of need for sanctioning seems rather similar across the two groups.  
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What do these numbers mean? The ratios 31:66 and 20:59 (66 and 59 are the total number of 
intervals featuring conversations about this story in each of the groups; there were 125 across the 
sessions) estimate how much each of the groups brought up the sanctioning norm to their 
conversations about this animation. These numbers help document that their perception of the lack 
of sanction by the teacher was not an isolated occurrence over the length of the meetings but a 
rather salient theme.  The ratios 20:23 and 31:40 estimate how often the conversations in each group 
were such that practitioners acknowledged responsibility to sanction a proposition as theorem in 
order to have it installed, in comparison to the number of conversations where that theme could 
have emerged (because they were already talking about the connection between the problems). The 
ratios 7:23 and 12:40 how often the conversations in each group were such that practitioners 
expressed that having proved the proposition was enough to have it installed, in comparison to the 
number of conversations where that theme could have emerged (because they were talking about 
the connection between the two problems). The comparison between those ratios for each group, 
namely 20:23 > 7:23 on the one hand and 31:40 > 12:40 on the other hand gauge the extent to 
which each of these two groups considered the norm to sanction more important than the lack of 
need to sanction. Those ratios and comparisons document the salience of the hypothesized norm in 
comparison with its negation.   
We take those numbers to mean that to the extent that these groups of practitioners represent 
the professional practice of geometry teachers, this practice is one such that the teacher is 
Table 2.    
 Intervals where 
connection between 
problems was discussed 
Intervals where evidence 
for the hypothesis was 
found (a = 1) 
Intervals where evidence 
against the hypothesis 
was found (b = 1) 
ESP Sessions 23 20 7 
ITH Sessions 40 31 12 
All Sessions 63 51 19 
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accountable for sanctioning a theorem. We don’t interpret those numbers to mean that most or any 
of the participants in the conversations actually acts according to the norm most of the time, and not 
even that they personally believe such norm is appropriate. To assess the extent to which these 
groups really represent what the norms of the professional practice are, a larger sample of groups 
would be needed. Our confirmation that the sanctioning norm has a hold on what these practitioners 
consider a teacher to be responsible for is valuable insofar as it provides the needed background for 
the third layer of the analysis. It helps support our contention that reactions to the presumption that 
the teacher had installed the base angles theorem were not located in isolated conversations, but a 
rather common occurrence. Again, as a whole, the coded data shows that out of 125 conversations 
about this animation, 51 included a discussion of the responsibility to sanction. Thus, the second 
layer of analysis demonstrates the importance that these groups of practitioners allocated to the 
norm and thus recommends engaging a third layer of analysis in which we draw on particulars from 
the various conversations to account for the practical rationality available to handle the norm.         
An Examination of How Participants Perceived and Appreciated  
the Actions in the Animated Story and the Alternatives They Proposed 
 In this section we account for the themes that the groups of participants brought up in their 
reactions to the animated story, specifically in those intervals where they spoke of the connection 
between the first and second problems. As a first foray into exploring the practical rationality with 
which teachers of geometry relate to the sanctioning norm, we account for the different ways in 
which participants perceived and appreciated the story that they confronted—how they saw it, what 
alternatives for action that they saw in it, and what they adduced as reasons for those.  
We presented the animation to the participants as showing an introduction of the base angles 
theorem. Yet, the animated story had been constructed so that the animated teacher did not 
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explicitly label any segment of classroom activity. Thus it was possible that participants cast the 
story not as one of installing a theorem but as a story of something else, for example as instances of 
“doing proofs,” (Herbst et al., 2009).  
Repairs of the Situation: What Is Really Going On?  
 As a group, participants repaired the presumption that the teacher was installing a theorem 
by casting the story in at least four ways: as a story (1) of students coming up with a solution to a 
problem different than the one the teacher had thought of, (2) of students failing to make a 
connection between two proof problems, (3) of students employing the strategy used in one problem 
to solve another, and (4) where the teacher could have better helped connect two problems had he 
chosen mathematical objects differently.  Figure 3 represents these different castings of the story all 
of which had in common that they repaired the situation: Rather than accepting the story as one 
about installing a theorem these repairs described it as instantiating a different situation, one of 
where what was at stake was students knowledge of how to do proofs. We discuss each of these in 
the following sections and come back to Figure 3 in the discussion. 
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Figure 3. Possibilities of the isosceles triangle story  
if installing a theorem is not at stake. 
‘There is a shorter solution’. In some intervals, the conversation accounted for the story as if it 
involved only two problems.  One of those interpretations was that these were just two problems, 
and that the animated teacher had a solution in mind for the second one that was different than what 
Lambda and Kappa had proposed. In interval ITH-121505-4 this was expressed thus: 
397 Cynthia Well he said there was a shorter way to do that proof, and then 
didn't share it.  Where some kids might have been confused with 
those [inaudible] and didn't go back and clear it up, just to make 
sure.  
398 Moderator You're saying the teacher didn't clarify what-- 
399 Cynthia Yeah, well, he, he had just said that there was a shorter way, and 
maybe there was a more direct way to do that proof and just didn't 
go back and clear it up with some students.  Cause maybe that, 
sometimes, I don't know, students go off on a tangent and they 
make the thing harder than it really is, even though they did it 
right, but.  And he, he said that, um, but then didn't go back and 
just show them maybe a more direct way.  [pause 2.5 sec]  It's a 
problem. 
400 Moderator  S- so do you think there was a shorter way for them to do it? I 
mean, wh- what did the teacher // 
401 Cynthia // He had said that there was. 
 
It can be noted that the second problem in the movie is referred as a proof problem that could be 
solved in a “shorter way” or a “more direct way.” But no reference is made to way in which the first 
problem influenced the posing or doing of the second problem. The conversation does not identify 
the teacher’s frustration with the length of the proof as related to the students’ lack of use of a piece 
of prior knowledge. No sympathy with the animated teacher’s frustration is expressed. Instead, the 
students are absolved for not doing what the teacher expected on grounds that are related to 
students’ general approach to doing problems—in particular, students are responsible for doing the 
second problem, but are not held accountable for knowing the base angles theorem. Instead the 
animated teacher is held accountable for showing what he was expecting. Thus, this rendering of the 
story accounts for the perception of different solutions for the same problem. An explicit category 
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of appreciation that a short solution is preferable is confronted with a tacit category of appreciation 
that a student’s own solution is preferable to someone else’s (especially the teacher’s) solution.  
 
‘These are two connected problems’. In some conversations, participants did expect students might 
make connections between one problem and the other. They were not necessarily articulate about 
what they expected students to do and not necessarily sympathetic with the animated teacher in his 
frustration. An important theme was “the connection” between those problems. The following 
excerpt from interval ITH-111605-18 exemplifies this rendering of the story: 
229 Megan … I think this whole video is sort of funny to me because it happens to 
me more in algebra, where the kids don't use a previous problem to 
help them.  It's just extremely frustrating and I don't think this is really 
a geometry issue, this is a common kid issue. 
230 Moderator So you think it won't happen, I mean, or it only happens in […] class. 
231 Megan No, it happens every day [laughs].  I'm saying it doesn't just happen in 
geometry.  It probably happens more in my algebra classes. 
232 Penelope Not, not making the connection. 
233 Megan Yeah, they just did the problem and they don't see that the next 
problem is just like one more little extension of -- no, it's a totally new 
problem! 
234 Penelope It's almost like you have to do an example for every problem that 
they're going to do on their homework or their assignment.  They don't 
make the connection that okay, if I take it one step further then I might 
be able to solve this problem, you know.  If you don't give an exact 
problem like that in your direct instruction they'll be like, oh you're 
trying to trick me or this or -- 
 
Thus the existence of a connection between the first and the second problem is acknowledged but 
perceived in very general terms: “us[ing] a previous problem to help [oneself]” (229) and “[a 
problem that did not come with an] exact problem like that in your direct instruction” (234). Unlike 
in the previous rendering of the story, in this one, sympathy with the animated teacher is expressed 
when observing that children will ordinarily fail to make those connections. But, in this interval, 
they show the object of their frustration as coarser in grain size than how a teacher would have to 
have perceived it if the teacher had deliberately constructed the two problems as a means to teach 
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the base angles theorem. Thus, the story accounts for the perception of connected problems, one is 
perceived as an extension of the other. Two categories of appreciation are identifiable here, (1) that 
it would have been desirable for students to make a connection between the problems, and (2) that 
students don’t usually make connections between problems. 
‘Students actually made a connection.’ In at least one conversation, teachers were able to perceive 
and appreciate the proof provided by Lambda and Kappa in ways that the animated teacher had not. 
In their solution to the second problem Lambda and Kappa had used the same strategy used in the 
homework problem—to draw a median. In interval ESP-011006-26, this was noted thus:  
494 Carl I think one of the most interesting things about this lesson was how they 
did actually take the hint from the first problem and apply it to the 
second problem.  Just the more difficult the knowing hint.  Like let's 
draw another altitude or whatever -- 
495 James Now we can drop lines down. 
496 Carl Yeah, now, I mean that's great except you're working way too hard now.  
I mean, so maybe they're just using now the wrong half of the hint. 
497 Moderator So should the teacher have given them a hint for the problem of the day? 
498 Esther No.  I liked it that they were having to think about what they still needed  
499 Carl Yeah. 
500 Esther -- and how they were gonna get there.  I liked the discussion that they 
had where they said, "Oh we can get these sides but we, we need 
something else and we're not seeing where to get it," and so I think that 
was good that they had to think about what they should do. 
  
The quoted conversation does show that participating teachers could perceive events at a grain size 
that looked into not just the existence of a connection between the problems but also the specific 
mathematics that the work in one task could afford the other. Thus, this rendering of the story also 
depicts the story as involving two connected problems, and an explicit connection between them is 
perceived: The same tactic (dropping an auxiliary line) is implemented in both. A category of 
appreciation identifiable here is that it is desirable for students to transform a diagram if they see it 
as advantageous. 
Accepted for publication at Cognition and Instruction.  
 35 
Making more apparent the connection between problems. Some conversations focused on what the 
animated teacher could have done to facilitate the making of a connection between the problems. In 
interval ITH-111605-24 two teachers discussed how they might have supported the students:  
329 Tina They said they used it.  But some kids wouldn't have made the 
connection from the first problem, problem 33, only the two sides are 
equal.  This one actually said it was isosceles. 
330 Denise So one of you would have, what if as a teacher you had went over to 
the first problem, the problem on the right, erased the median and 
drew the triangle inside.  So you're using the same original triangle.  
Am I making sense with what I'm saying?  And said, well let's try this.  
And used the same triangle, erased the median and drew the other 
triangle.  Do you think they would follow? 
331 Tina My students? 
332 Denise Cause then they, yeah. 
333 Res. Who would do that? You would do that? 
334 Denise No, I'm just asking what if a teacher did that.  Yeah, what if I was a 
teacher to do that. 
335 Res. That would be clever. 
336 Denise I mean would it make it better connected?  [Pause.]  Cause it seems 
like the problem is, the students, they did one problem and then they 
erased their brain and then they went on to another, which students do 
all the time, okay through with that problem, this is something totally 
different.  You, know?  [Laughs.] 
 
In turn 330, the suggestion is made that instead of drawing a new triangle (on the left of the board) 
for the problem of the day, the teacher could have used the same diagram used by the first student 
(Rho). The teacher could have erased the median Rho had drawn and drawn instead the triangle 
formed by the midpoints of the sides. The goal of such moves would apparently be to “make it [the 
second problem] better connected [to the first],” (ITH-111605-24-336) so that students would not 
“erase [the one problem from] their brain and then [go] to another, which students do all the time” 
(ITH-111605-24-336). We note that such a solution to the pedagogical issue would indeed keep a 
close connection between the two problems as related to the same triangle. We note that in that case 
the solution of the second problem would clearly make use of the fact proved earlier about that 
triangle (that base angles are equal in that triangle) but it would not clearly make use of the result 
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valid for all triangles, also produced by the first problem.  We thus take these conversations as 
containing repairs of the situation: What was perceived to be at stake in the story was the doing of 
two proof problems which were connected by the possibility that both could be posed in the same 
triangle; and, in that case, the fact proved by one problem could be useful information for the doing 
of the second problem. What was missed, or perhaps downplayed, in that rendering of the story is, 
of course, the general result proved in the first problem, that any time two sides in a triangle are 
congruent their opposite angles would be congruent as well. Thus, in this rendering of the story, we 
note as categories of perception the specific objects on which the problems are posed (how 
mathematical objects are represented through description and notation). As categories of 
appreciation we note that (1) students are likelier to make connections between problems if they are 
posed in relation to the same mathematical object and (2) that enhancing the likelihood of their 
making of such connections by posing the problems in relation to the same object is more desirable 
for the teacher than expecting students to make connections across objects on their own.  
Repairs of the Task: “He Is Trying to Get Them to Use the Theorem”  
While the interpretations of the story provided above repaired the presumption that a 
theorem had been at stake, other renderings of the story accepted this presumption and, instead, 
repaired the specific tasks that the teacher, or the students, had to do to fulfill the installation of the 
theorem. In these renderings of the story, we encountered repairs to how students had responded—
including (1) rendering the story as one where a theorem had indeed been proved for homework, (2) 
a rendering that cast all proof problems done by students as theorems of some sort, and (3) a 
rendering that questioned the likelihood of the event that no student be able to connect the result 
proved in the first problem to the second problem. We also found renderings of the story that 
repaired what the teacher had done or failed to do, including the indications that the teacher missed 
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(4) labeling the exercise as one of proving a theorem, (5) asking students to state conceptually what 
they had proved, (6) labeling the result proved in a way that could be referred later, and (7) 
introducing the first result as theorem later, on account of its usefulness to do the second problem. 
Figure 4 represents these different castings of the story all of which had in common that they 
accepted the situation as one about installing the base angles theorem and repaired one or more of 
the tasks of the teacher or the student. We discuss each of these in the following sections and come 
back to Figure 4 in the discussion section. 
 
Figure 4. Possibilities of the isosceles triangle story if installing a theorem is at stake. 
 
A theorem was proved for homework. In most of the intervals where participants talked about the 
connection between first and second problem, they recognized that the intent of the teacher in 
giving the second problem had been to enable students to use the result proved in the first problem. 
For example, right after watching the teacher pose the second problem, we heard that the animated 
teacher’s expectation was that students:  
Accepted for publication at Cognition and Instruction.  
 38 
Use that theorem that she just proved and then get side angle side right 
away.  Three steps. (ITH-111605-18-227) 
 
Likewise, on the following month’s meeting of the same group, and in response to the observation 
that the teacher was not happy with the way students had done the second problem, we heard  
He's trying to get them to use the theorem that was proved in the homework.  That if you 
have two equal sides then the base angles are equal.  If they'd used that they wouldn't have 
had to prove the triangles were equal.  That would wipe out three steps in their proof. (ITH-
121505-4-403) 
 
Even though in the animation the first problem is not referred to as a theorem, the utterances above 
identify it as a theorem and note that, if that theorem were used, the solution to the second proof 
problem would be shorter. In these conversations, the theorem and the teacher’s intention to install 
it were perceived. We note here not only that the problem proved by Rho was perceived as the proof 
of a theorem (rather than just a proof problem), but also that this proof was perceived as proving a 
general statement (stated in terms of concepts such as equal sides and base angles). As categories of 
appreciation here, we note that it is desirable to shorten proofs by using known theorems. 
‘You always have one student who can say those things.’ In some conversations, participants saw 
the intent of the teacher to enable students to use the theorem, and were baffled at the lack of 
positive response on the part of students. In interval ESP-011006-51, we heard 
1082 Esther Uh...I have a lot kids that are looking for a shortcut.  I think there 
probably would have been at least some kid in the class, because my 
class isn't that small. 
1083 Carl Somebody would have.  Somebody would have noticed the shortcut. 
1084 Esther I think somebody would have said, "Well...you didn't have to draw 
that in." I think some kid would have said that. 
1085 Carl And maybe that's my -- Maybe that's the big criticism, is that... 
Everybody's too clueless in this, in this thing, y'know?  The students 
are really too -- there's nobody in the class that's really saying -- 
because you always have someone in the class. 
1086 Esther Somebody would say, "Well I don't need to draw it in because we did 
it," I think somebody would have said that. 
1087 Carl Somebody would have said that. 
1088 Res. And the teacher would, would move to hearing that person who had 
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the idea? 
1089 Megan The de-- this guy definitely would.  He's dying up there. 
1090  [laughter]  
 
Thus, participants realized that it would have been on the students’ best interest to use the result 
proved (it was a shortcut), and expected that at least one student should have seen the connection. 
That is, they could see how noticing the usefulness of the result proved could come from the floor, 
through at least one student, and how that student could spread the message to the whole class. It 
was frustrating and unrealistic in their view that no student in the animation had done that. 
Participants suggested that other opinions could have been solicited to make room for that 
contribution. Participants made comments that repaired the way the solution to the second problem 
was managed tactically, indicating, among other things, that a solution that used the result proved in 
the first problem could have been offered had the teacher continued to prod other students to share 
other possible ways of solving the problem—with questions such as “can anybody think of another 
way, or a shorter [way]?” (ESP 010006-71-1136).  
We thus note in this rendering of the story a category of perception that singles out a 
particular kind of student, the student who is able to note and speak up about connections that are 
not apparent to the majority of geometry students. We note also two categories of appreciation 
related to that category of students: (1) that it would be usual for a geometry class to have at least 
one student with those characteristics, and (2) that it would be appropriate for a teacher to count on 
that student’s noticing of the import on the second proof of the result proved on the first problem. 
We also note as a category of appreciation (3) that the emergence of a reference to the first problem 
would have benefited from the teacher’s prod to give other, shorter solutions to the second problem. 
 ‘But to them it was just a proof problem.’ We had hypothesized that the work the teacher needs to 
do to install a theorem includes sanctioning a proposition as theorem. If our hypothesis was tenable 
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and participants acknowledged the teacher’s expectation that students use the result proved in the 
first problem as if it were a theorem, we predicted participants would react to the lack of 
sanctioning by the teacher in the story. This reaction was manifest by way of repairs such as:  
Right.  So they haven't proved that, they haven't technically proved that theorem yet, 
even though they did the problem proving it, he hasn't stated it as a theorem yet.  Do 
you see what I'm saying? (ITH-111605-19-255) 
 
Later on that same session, in interval ITH-111605-21, participants picked up on that theme 
 
292 Edwin Yeah.  They haven't made it official yet, it was a problem in the book.  It 
wasn't a theorem you know, even though they proved it, it's not-- 
293 Tina They don't look at it as a theorem yet. 
 
The distinction between a problem in the book and a theorem pointed to the lack of sanctioning. In 
another conversation, it was noted that students’ work could have turned out to be different had the 
task statement been different: 
If the problem in the book had said, "Prove theorem," and then said "base angles of an 
isosceles triangles are congruent" and then the kid did this exact problem on the board 
everybody woulda used it on the other problem. (ESP-011006-38-793) 
 
And also, 
Once you come up with something like earth-shattering like the […] like the base angles of 
a triangle, of an isosceles triangle are congruent, you have to do a song and dance or else it's 
not gonna get into their toolbox, y'know. (ESP-011006-23-440) 
 
Thus, sanctioning mattered. It mattered, in particular, as regards to clarifying for students what was 
at stake in the work being done. Participants perceived a difference between the bare statement of a 
proof problem and the same statement being sanctioned as a theorem. The categories of 
appreciation we observed here include that it would be usual for students to think of a proof 
problem as only that unless it was also identified as a theorem.  
Anything they prove could be a theorem. In contrast with the notion that, for students, all they had 
done was a proof exercise, we heard 
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That's sort of interesting because every time they do a proof in their book it is, it could be a 
theorem. (ITH-111605-21-295) 
 
And again later in the same interval 
 
299 Megan I never thought of it before, but it's true.  Every single little homework 
problem that they prove something, granted it's a theorem specific for that 
little diagram, but -- 
300 Edwin Right. 
 
Thus, one of the ways in which the proposition proved could be perceived is as a theorem, because 
it had been proved. Yet the qualification is meaningful: “a theorem specific for that little diagram.” 
This could be contrasted with the comment, noted in the previous section, that if the exercise had 
said to “prove a theorem” students would have used it—in this comment the theorem is described as 
a theorem that applies to the set of figures described by the concept “isosceles triangles.” Thus, 
participants repaired the task by bringing to question what the proposition was, but were accepting 
of the possibility that students could be the ones proving a theorem. We note here as a category of 
perception what a theorem is (for participants): anything that students proved could be considered a 
theorem, because it has been proved. As a category of appreciation we identify, in this rendering of 
the story, that it is usual for students to prove what could be considered theorems specific to a 
figure.   
 ‘So what did we just prove?’ The participants in our sessions were attuned to the fact that the 
proposition proved by Rho looked different than how the statements of theorems ordinarily look. 
They proposed that the teacher could have helped turn Rho’s proof into the installation of a 
theorem. In interval ESP-011006-38, they spoke thus 
807 Megan Oh that's true.  If it said that in words instead of just having the 
symbols, 'cause this particular problem just said prove angle B equals 
angle C and didn't say you have an isosc--that's true, I bet you're right.  
I bet if it had said it in words like as a statement it would have been 
more legitimized too.  Because that's how they're written out usually.  
Not written out like this. 
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808 Moderator So you're saying even if it hadn't been called a theorem, if it had been 
said in words people would have been more likely to use it. 
809 Megan Yeah, they said "prove the base angles -- use this diagram to prove the 
base angles of an isosceles triangle are congruent."  You're right.  Yeah 
I think you're right. 
810 James Yeah that's a good point too because one of the things I was gonna say 
about when they went to the next exercise, a lot of times when students 
are looking at this triangle ABC, even if you draw another triangle 
ABC they've kind of been, uh, trained that that's a different triangle and 
so that angle B and that angle C and that AB and that AC don't 
necessarily have to be congruent in the new triangle, y'know, so, so if 
you aren't given that then you know it's a different triangle so it kind of 
segregates out the two things.  They - y'know I could see then because 
of that where they wouldn't relate "oh yeah, we did triangle ABC," but 
that's not the triangle we're working (on there.) 
  
Later in that session the participants discussed whether having students translate the specific result 
proved into a conceptual register (Weiss & Herbst, 2007) would enhance their chances to use it. In 
that context the following conversation ensued in interval ESP-011006-68: 
868 Karen "So what did we just prove?" kind of thing. I, yeah I like it. 
869 Megan But you can't do it all the time.  You'd have to look through the 
assignment and say, [Esther: Yeah...] problem number 6 and 10 I want 
you to, when you finish it, write in your own words what you think you 
proved.  Because some of them like [the moderator is] saying are... 
870 Esther Not going to be productive. 
871 Megan Yeah. 
872 Res. So some exercises, you wouldn't come up with a nice statement. 
873 Megan Right.  No. 
874 Res. And why, so you're saying it wouldn't be worth actually going through 
the exercise of trying to say what you did? Wha-- say in words? 
875 Esther Well because the conditions are so specific, I think is what we're saying.  
It had to be such a specific set of circumstances that it doesn't -- it's not 
really a good generalizing situation.  I think is what, I think that's what 
we meant... 
876 Res. OK.  And you're saying many of the proof exercises aren't. 
877 Esther Well sometim—yeah, well some of them are like that, yeah. 
 
Participants also indicated that the location of and attention given to problem 33 could have been 
different. In interval ITH-111605-46 it was suggested that, since homework problem 33 contained 
important material for the day’s work, it should have been left to the end of homework review, so as 
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to bring it closer to the problem of the day. Also participants noted that more time would have been 
needed to reflect on problem 33, suggesting questions such as “Does everybody realize what we did 
up there?”  (ITH-111605-46-641). That would have been preferable to how the animated teacher 
actually handled it (merely saying “make sure you understand what Rho has done there”). So, while 
proof problem number 33 was, in this case, one that could be translated into a property of all 
isosceles triangles, the participants were not confident that the same should, or could, be done about 
any proof problem. In many cases, the specificity of the conclusion proved might make it not 
generalizable into a useful result. In this rendering of the story we note, as a category of perception, 
the possibility to translate some proof problems into conceptual propositions. We note also as 
categories of appreciation that (1) it would have been appropriate for the animated teacher to 
prompt students to translate what they had proved into a conceptual statement, (2) for many of the 
proofs that students ordinarily do, such translation would not be productive, (3) it would have been 
appropriate to locate the first problem closer to the second problem so as to make its relevance more 
apparent, and (4) it would have been appropriate to better support students’ attention to what had 
been proved in the first problem by giving time for reflection as well as appropriate questions.   
 ‘What did you expect they put in there: Problem 33?’ Another repair of the tasks done while 
installing the base angles theorem consisted of noticing that the lack of a name to use in referring to 
the result proved conspired against its usability. Hence, in interval ITH-111605-21: 
284 Res. Why do [you] think students [would not] use it.  The teacher expected 
them to use it. 
285 Tina Because we haven't said it's so. 
286 Edwin We haven't given it a name, haven't made it official. 
 
And later in interval ITH-111605-36 
 
540 Res. So you would expect that they would make that connection instead of 
reproducing the same proof. 
541 Tina If they didn't and they reproduced it I would’ve done it different than 
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him and I would have written a whole big long proof up on the board if 
they did.  And then what I would have done is, ok these 4 steps, notice 
they're the same as the problem we did over here, we could have 
condensed this all down and just said this because of problem 33. 
542 Megan And then, but kids aren't used to writing that as using proofs. 
543 Tina Right. 
 
Thus we noted in these conversations as a category of perception how elements of knowledge are 
labeled and as a category of appreciation the notion that if the proved statement had had a name this 
would have likely enabled students’ use of it in the second proof.  
It could have been sanctioned later. As noted above, it was a relatively common occurrence that 
participants found fault with the animated teacher for not having sanctioned the theorem once 
proved. However, they also valued the animated teacher’s strategy of giving students the 
opportunity to notice and use the result before sanctioning it. A compromise position was 
articulated apropos of the discussion of how the animated teacher handled students’ approaches to 
the second problem. The following conversation happened in interval ITH-111605-54: 
718 Animation ["We knew that it would have to be true, but we had to prove it." 
Animation stops.] 
719 Tina So right there he should have said it. 
720 Denise And after that he just goes on. 
721 Moderator And you're saying he should have stopped there? 
722 Denise Right, isn't that the main point of it?  He should have stopped and said 
well how did you know it?  Because they, he said, "Well sort of, we 
knew it, we just have to prove it." 
723 Tina Well then why didn't he call on Rho right then?  Wasn't it Rho?  Rho 
who did the first problem?  And say, "Rho, how would they?" you 
know. 
724 Denise Right. 
725 Moderator So you're saying that -- 
726 Tina He missed the opportunity. 
 
That is, participants identified the discussion of the second problem not only as a chance to verify 
whether or not students were able to reuse what they had proved, but also as a place where the 
teacher could have exercised his duty to sanction the theorem. The second problem gave a context 
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for showing the usefulness of having the first result as a theorem, since having this result as a 
theorem could help reduce the number of steps in the proof of the second problem. Participants 
recommended that the proof of the second problem could have been written down in detail and then 
compared side by side with the proof for the first problem, so as to impress upon the students that 
the first statement proved was useful to shorten the second proof. Participants also noted that, while 
doing the second problem, some students in the animation had found the theorem statement in the 
book: Participants recommended that at that point in time the teacher could have connected it with 
the first problem, indicating that they could use the theorem because it had already been proved.  
Thus, participants could see value in delaying the sanctioning of the proposition, and did not 
necessarily expect that the teacher sanctioned the proposition just as soon as the proof was done. As 
a category of perception, we observe here participants’ attunement to the timing of the sanction of a 
theorem and to the possibility to justify why a statement should be considered a theorem. As 
categories of appreciation we note that (1) it would be desirable to give students the chance to use 
the proved result in the second problem, (2) students might need the teacher’s prompt to look for 
similarities between the two proofs, (3) it would be appropriate for the teacher to note that because 
of its relevance in solving other problems that first result should be a theorem, and (4) students 
might need the teacher to note similarities between the statement proved and the theorem in the 
book. 
 
Discussion: The Practical Rationality  
with which Teachers Handle the Installation of Theorems 
The previous section has shown how our thought experiments can allow us to do two things. 
On the one hand, from the existence of reactions to the animated teacher’s goal, actions, and 
eventual frustration we confirm that, to the extent that these small groups of participants represent 
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teachers of high school geometry as a group, practitioners recognize that a teacher is expected to 
sanction a proposition as theorem if students will be expected to use it. Teachers recognize that as a 
norm, which is apparent in expressions like “there needs to be a discovery entrance or something” 
(ITH-111605-21-290) or “when you discover something earth shattering, you have to do a song and 
dance” (ESP-011006-23-440). On the other hand, the thought experiments elicit from practitioners 
data that sheds light on their practical rationality. This comes in the form of categories of perception 
and appreciation that participants utilize in talk as they construct their reactions to the animation—
particularly in rendering the story watched and in appraising moments in the story watched, or in 
conceivable alternatives. We dedicate most of this section to synthesize what we have learned about 
this rationality through the use of the animated story “Isosceles triangles: A Homework Problem.” 
The existence of a norm in an instructional situation does not mean an individual teacher 
would necessarily act according to it. In the case examined, the norm for a teacher to sanction a 
result as theorem means that teachers may default to sanction a result as theorem, if they want to 
hold students accountable to use it. Yet, the data shows that scenarios like the one depicted in the 
animation could be viable, albeit with some modifications.  
A first set of reactions was classed under the heading “Repairs of the situation” and consist 
of the different ways in which practitioners countered the notion that what was at stake in the 
episode was the installation of a theorem. Instead they rendered the episode as one of doing proof 
problems or as one of demonstrating knowledge of a proof tactic. The diagram in Figure 3 accounts 
for this set of renderings of the story, showing what kind of work could be done and the exchange 
values that this work could have.  
In narrating (or creating alternatives to) the episode in those ways practitioners demonstrated 
their perception attuned to the following categories: 
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• Problems: Two problems can be connected in different ways such as when one extends 
on the other or when one uses the same tactic as the other.  
• Solutions to problems: Students can produce solutions to a problem that are different 
than what the teacher expects.  
• Mathematical objects and their representation: The same mathematical object may be 
referred to with different descriptions or notations. 
 
 In arguing for the various moves in these set of stories, participants called forth the following 
categories of appreciation, which enabled appraisals on the courses of action listed in Figure 3:  
• Length of solution: A short solution to a problem is preferable to a long solution.  
• Authorship of solution: A student’s own solution is preferable to someone else’s (the 
teacher’s) solution. 
• Using prior work: It is desirable for students to use the solution of a problem in solving 
another problem.  
• Making connections: Students usually don’t make connections between problems. 
Students are more likely to make connections between problems if they are posed in 
relation to the same mathematical object. 
• Modifying a diagram: It is desirable for students to add an auxiliary line if this is needed 
for solving a problem. 
 
In other reactions to the animation, participants were amenable to the idea that through giving these 
two problems the teacher meant to install the base angles theorem. Figure 4 shows the various 
renderings of the story that according to participants were aimed at this goal, showing what kind of 
work could have been done and the exchange values it could have had. The dotted boxes around 
clusters of possible moves identify moments when one option was to sanction the proposition (to 
be) proved as a theorem. In narrating (or creating alternatives to) the episode in those ways 
practitioners demonstrated their perception attuned to the following categories (sample): 
• Statements: The statement proved in a proof problem can be interpreted as a general 
statement. 
• Theorem: Theorems are propositions that are useful to prove other things 
• Proofs: A proof problem can also be the proof of a theorem 
• Students: There are geometry students who are able to note, and speak up about, 
connections that are not apparent to the majority of other students.  
• Timing: A proposition might be sanctioned as theorem when the proposition is deemed 
useful 
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In arguing for the various moves in these set of stories, participants called forth categories of 
appreciation including the following (which warranted the courses of action listed in Figure 4).  
• Theorems shorten proofs: It is desirable to shorten proofs by using known theorems 
instead of proving anew properties that could be inferred. 
• Students who make connections exist: It is usual for a geometry class to have at least one 
student who can make and speak up about connections that others don’t make.   
• Proof problems are just that: Students are likely to think of a proof problem as merely a 
proof problem if it is not identified as a theorem.  
• Conceptual propositions: It would be appropriate for a teacher to prompt students to 
translate what they have proved in a proof exercise into a conceptual proposition. 
• Named or labeled statements: If a proved statement were labeled or named, students 
would be likely to use it later. 
• Useful statements are theorems: It would be appropriate for the teacher to note that 
because of its relevance in solving other problems a proved result should be a theorem. 
• Theorems and the statement proved: Students might need the teacher to note similarities 
between the statement proved and the theorem in the book. 
• Problem relevance: It would have been appropriate to locate the first problem closer to 
the second problem so as to make its relevance more apparent.  
 
Among other things, the data shows that while ordinarily a teacher would be expected to 
sanction a proved proposition as a theorem if he or she expected students to use it, it is quite 
possible for a teacher to create conditions for students to use a proposition they have proved, 
without directly telling them to do so. Our data shows that a number of resources are available for a 
teacher to support students in recognizing the usefulness of the proposition proved. These include 
prompting them to restate the result proved in general terms, prompting students to consider 
whether the proof of the new problem could be shortened, and promoting thinking and discussion of 
the import of what had been proved. In interval ITH-111605-69, we heard that students could be 
asked 
897 Denise Can we make a conjecture from problem 33?  Let's look at problem 33 
and everybody come up with a conjecture.  And then I'll have people tell 
me what their conjectures are.  I bet you 9 times out of 10 someone's 
gonna say an isosceles triangle has two congruent base angles.  Cause 
that's what problem 33 is, and then you could say well that's what I've 
been trying to tell you guys that's our next theorem. And then they came 
up with that on their own still. 
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The importance of these findings about how practical rationality can support geometry 
teachers handling of the situation of installing a theorem can be argued on account of policy pushes 
on instruction that might possibly create a tension for a teacher. On the one hand, teachers are 
expected to engage students with the ideas and practices of a discipline. This could mean that 
students’ opportunity to learn should include target propositions that the discipline treasures as 
theorems and that students should have the opportunity to learn the role that theorems play as 
targets of mathematical investigation and capsules of mathematical knowledge. On the other hand, 
teachers are expected to engage students as active participants of mathematical inquiry.  This could 
mean that studying should not just involve acquiring information about those theorems that 
mathematicians have targeted in the past, but actually pursuing them as targets of students’ own 
mathematical work. A teacher is expected to aim at both sound disciplinary knowledge and active 
construction by students. That kind of instruction may be desirable, but one needs to ask whether 
and how such kind of instruction is feasible from the perspective of the practitioner and how a 
practitioner can manage the tensions that come along with making it happen. We believe the results 
of this study provide some pointers that can inform that question.  
The particular story we used to spur conversation among geometry teachers displayed a 
rather modest attempt on the part of a teacher to allocate agency to students in installing a theorem. 
Students were given the opportunity to avail themselves of a prior result to produce a new result. 
The way the prior result had been encountered and recorded made it already mathematically 
correct—the opportunity for students seemed to include little risk for the teacher. Still, our 
participants found that management risky and in their comments they elaborated on those risks.  
A main risk is that of losing control of the boundaries between the statements that students 
prove when they “do proofs” and the theorems that the class needs to record as valuable knowledge. 
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We contend that the sanctioning norm describes a customary practice that exists to protect those 
boundaries. The practical rationality of mathematics teaching contains resources that support the 
desirability to challenge such norm—note above categories of appreciation that put a premium on 
students’ making connections. But the prospect of success depends on more than the will of the 
teacher to challenge custom. Whereas all proof exercises might be stated as true propositions, if 
anything that could be proved received the status of theorem, that might not only create a 
misrepresentation of disciplinary knowledge (where not all true propositions are theorems) but it 
would also tax the capacity of the class (and of the teacher) to remember what is publicly known. 
Conversely, if nothing in the students’ activity was differentiated as more important than the rest, 
the activity might not increase students’ awareness of their increased knowledge of mathematics. It 
is understandable, therefore, why the norm is that the teacher sanctions theorems even if students 
might be fully able (and enabled) to conjecture and prove them. It seems plausible that instructional 
activities that protect a role for (and support the work of) the teacher in negotiating whether a 
statement can be a theorem would fare better than instructional activities that implicate the teacher 
in tacitly canonizing any conjecture made and proved by students, or than activities that prevent the 
teacher from any such sanctioning (see Chazan and Houde, 1989). 
 A potential risk of a teacher’s reluctance to sanction a theorem was anticipated in the section 
titled “Making more apparent the connection between problems.” An inflexible position against 
sanctioning, but seeking student success, might lead to reducing the identification and reinvestment 
of prior knowledge (the use of a theorem) to the mere making of connections across problems. A 
teacher who renounces the responsibility to sanction might otherwise work to increase the chances 
that students make some connection by juxtaposing in time tasks that enlist the same operations, or 
by cueing such recognition through the reinvestment of the same representations in subsequent 
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problems (reminiscent of some teaching of computational methods). Connections made in this way 
may appear more actively made by students, but their value as mathematical practices would be 
more questionable. In particular, they could turn legitimate mathematical activity into activity that 
does not generate knowledge as value added. 
The data seem to suggest that organizing tasks in such a way that students can recognize a 
previously proved proposition as useful, and can reuse it in solving a new problem more efficiently, 
may be desirable from the perspective of geometry teachers. Supports to make such activity feasible 
should include ways for the teacher to monitor the mathematical qualities of the connections made, 
and ways for the teacher to maintain students’ work within boundaries that permit it to be cashable 
or exchangeable for claims to useful knowledge. One of these supports can come in the form of 
providing an explicit, metamathematical or metadiscursive, definition of theorem as part of the 
curriculum, a definition that sets expectations for a proposition to be a theorem (or property) to the 
extent that such proposition is important, useful as a tool to find out other things (as much as it is a 
result by itself). Another support could include making room for the custom of translating the 
propositions students prove as exercises into the conceptual register, routinely asking questions like 
“How would you state what you proved in words?” or even “Would the proof you wrote be true for 
any isosceles triangle?” In general, it seems as though students’ capacity to consider what they 
prove as potentially useful, and thus memorable, hinges on developing means to turn the claims 
they prove (rather than just the proofs themselves) into objects of reflection.  
 
Conclusion: About Constructs and Methods Used in this Study 
In this study, we have illustrated a new way to study the rationality that undergirds the 
activity of teaching. While observation and ethnography of the wisdom of practice (Shulman, 2000) 
provide initial means for discovery of what is involved in the work of teaching, our theory and 
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methods contribute ways of making and probing hypotheses about the practical rationality of 
mathematics teachers. Specifically, the notion of instructional situation (e.g., “installing a theorem”) 
specifies the object of study, the notion of norm (e.g., the “sanctioning” norm) helps model that 
object of study, and the notion of a thought experiment that uses a prototype of such a model helps 
elicit data that inform the object of study. The notion of practical rationality gives a name to the data 
so collected: The practice’s ways and means of handling the demands of an instructional situation. 
 Practical rationality contains the categories of perception and appreciation with which 
teachers relate to the demands of an instructional situation. Thus, different categories may be used 
to handle different situations. This was particularly visible in the data when one contrasts the 
categories of perception and appreciation brought up to reject the presumption that the animated 
teacher was installing a theorem and those brought up to repair the way in which the teacher went 
about installing a theorem. Thus, we conjecture that practitioners may differently perceive and value 
objects and actions depending on the instructional situation where they are working. If this 
conjecture is plausible, the notion of practical rationality may be useful in enabling the field to 
move the discussion of teachers’ thinking about teaching beyond the study of broad teacher beliefs 
and deeper into the study of decision making in specific instructional situations.  
Obviously, it is possible that the empirical study of practical rationality in different 
situations (e.g., “installing theorems” and “doing proofs”) might yield as a result that some elements 
of practical rationality are common across instructional situations. These might be attributable to the 
practical rationality with which practitioners handle general demands of the didactical contract for a 
particular course (e.g., high school geometry). Further, it is possible that in eliciting practical 
rationality for situations in geometry as well as in algebra, we might find evidence that some 
elements of practical rationality recur across courses of study and propose that the ways in which 
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practitioners differently handle the whole didactical contract for mathematics instruction rely on 
some common elements of practical rationality. We consider it premature to make those kinds of 
claims and suggest that if our technique can be used in other inquiries, researchers need to start 
from modeling a particular instructional situation. The paper shows how such study of teaching can 
be conducted, by starting from a hypothesis about what is normative in a situation, designing a 
representation that probes such norm, and obtaining from practitioners data that accounts for the 
categories of perception and value with which they handle such norm and explain its presence. 
We suggest that our data collection technique has been particularly helpful to elicit these 
categories of perception and appreciation from practitioners. Our classroom observations would 
have enabled us to create a survey instrument in which we asked practitioners whether they 
perceived a teacher to be under expectations such as sanctioning a theorem or whether they would 
consider it appropriate to let students figure out on their own that they can use a proved result. But, 
in turning that tacit norm and its alternative (or breach) into explicit statements, something about the 
nature of the phenomenon would have been taken for granted: The extent to which it is an issue for 
teachers whether they sanction a theorem or not. By using scenarios as prompts for teachers to 
comment on, our technique does not make the assumption that norms like that one are explicit.  
Our data collection technique has been particularly helpful also in eliciting practitioners’ 
rationality apropos of specific clusters of practices in geometry classrooms, which we call 
instructional situations. Clearly, video records could have been used for similar purposes, as others’ 
and our earlier work shows (Herbst & Chazan, 2003; Jacobs & Morita, 2002; Nachlieli & Herbst, 
2009; Weiss, Herbst, & Chen, 2009). Video records may however call too much attention to the 
individuality of people and settings away from the practice whose norms we are interested in 
exploring. But by using non-descript cartoon characters we have been able to focus participant 
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reactions on pedagogical and mathematical aspects of practice rather than on the individualities of 
people and settings (Herbst et al., in press). We are fully aware that human action is not just a 
response to the demands of a practice (in particular, a situation); action also is expression of 
individuality and an adaptation to context. But while it seems to us that those aspects of action are 
well taken care of by disciplines such as psychology and sociology, the need to understand the 
specifics of instructional practice in mathematics require its own theories and methods. While we 
reduce some complexity (particularly individual differences and social context), we are able to 
bring in quite a bit of instructional complexity through the use of our technique.   
Finally our technique of using these representations of teaching with groups of teachers has 
served us well to inventory the content of practical rationality as it concerns the work of installing a 
theorem. Clearly we could have used these representations to broker individual interviews and that 
would have been advisable if we had been after a different research goal. The work with 
homogeneous groups of practitioners has allowed us to get at two things that might have been 
harder to get to in individual interviews. On the one hand, by having to respond to the animations in 
front of their colleagues, practitioners could not stray too far from informing about the norm 
without having to qualify their comments. This enabled us to inventory, as viable responses to the 
norm, courses of action that reflected more the rationality of the practice than that of the individual 
practitioners. On the other hand, by being able to participate in conversations about practice with 
their colleagues rather than being the sole speakers, individual teachers had more encouragement 
and support to contribute to inventorying the rationality of practice. Some times individuals 
contributed merely by “chiming in;” other times it was apparent that their capacity to be critical of 
the instruction represented fed from the number of them and their agreement. In particular, 
participants were more likely to use their own categories of perception (and language) than if they 
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had been responding to questions from an interviewer. Obviously if we were interested in issues of 
individual growth through these sessions, individual histories becoming socialized to the norms of 
practice, or individual knowledge handling those practices, other techniques for data collection or 
data analysis would be needed. 
This paper does not investigate how individual teachers relate to the construct we call 
practical rationality. Thus far, in our conceptualization, practical rationality belongs to practice and 
practitioners are socialized to it (Waller, 1961). Instrumental in maintaining that interpretation of 
the data were the sampling decision to work with a group of experienced teachers of high school 
geometry and the design decision to engage them in collective thought experiments materialized as 
conversations. Thus, while individuals made the comments, they did so under the surveillance of 
their colleagues—what they said might have been what they personally believed or what they were 
expected to personally believe—for our purposes what mattered is that it could acceptably be said 
within a conversation among colleagues socialized into the practice of teaching geometry. Future 
research could investigate how individuals position and cluster within collectives as far as their 
socialization into the rationality of practice: Are there differentiable classes of practitioners that 
might embody substantial differences in practical rationality? Future research could also look into 
how individuals become socialized into the rationality of practice: Are there mechanisms that do 
that job and how do they work? Finally, future research could look into the relationships between 
individual knowledge and practical rationality: Can the presence and amount of particular kinds of 
teacher knowledge help explain the considerations that a practitioner make when handling the 
demands of an instructional situation?          
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